Profiles & Groups - Nono Docs

Profiles are pre-configured capability sets that define what a sandboxed process can access. Groups are the composable building blocks that profiles are made from. Together they codify security policy so you don’t have to specify flags manually every time.

Use nono policy to inspect, compare, and validate profiles and groups from the command line. See Policy Introspection for details.

Profiles

Why Profiles?

Manually specifying capabilities for every tool is tedious and error-prone:

# Without profiles - verbose and easy to misconfigure
nono run --allow-cwd --read ~/.claude --read-file ~/.claude/config.json -- claude

Profiles simplify this:

# With profiles - concise and auditable
nono run --profile claude-code -- claude

Profile Sources

Profiles can come from three sources, in order of precedence:

Source	Location	Trust Level
CLI flags	Command line	Highest - explicit user intent
User profiles	`~/.config/nono/profiles/`	Medium - user-defined
Built-in profiles	Compiled into binary	Base - audited defaults

CLI flags always override profile settings.

Profile Format

Profiles use JSON format:

{
  "meta": {
    "name": "my-agent",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "description": "Profile for my custom agent"
  },
  "workdir": {
    "access": "readwrite"
  },
  "security": {
    "groups": ["node_runtime", "python_runtime", "git_config"]
  },
  "filesystem": {
    "allow": ["$HOME/.config/my-agent"],
    "read": [],
    "write": [],
    "allow_file": [],
    "read_file": [],
    "write_file": []
  },
  "policy": {
    "exclude_groups": [],
    "add_allow_read": [],
    "add_allow_write": [],
    "add_allow_readwrite": [],
    "add_deny_access": [],
    "add_deny_commands": [],
    "override_deny": []
  },
  "network": {
    "block": false
  }
}

Working Directory

The workdir section controls whether and how the current working directory is automatically shared with the sandboxed process.

Value	Meaning
`"none"`	No automatic CWD access (default if section omitted)
`"read"`	Read-only access to CWD
`"write"`	Write-only access to CWD
`"readwrite"`	Full read+write access to CWD

When a profile specifies a workdir access level, nono will prompt the user to confirm CWD sharing (unless --allow-cwd is used to skip the prompt).

Policy Overrides

The policy section provides fine-grained, additive and subtractive composition on top of inherited groups and filesystem configuration. This is the primary mechanism for surgically customizing inherited profiles without redefining everything from scratch.

Field	Description
`exclude_groups`	Remove groups from the resolved group set (exclusion wins over addition)
`add_allow_read`	Additional read-only directories to allow
`add_allow_write`	Additional write-only directories to allow
`add_allow_readwrite`	Additional read+write directories to allow
`add_deny_access`	Additional deny rules to apply (block read and write content). On macOS, Unix socket paths also emit a `network-outbound` deny so that `connect(2)` to the socket is blocked.
`add_deny_commands`	Command names (basename only) to block execution of. Complements `add_deny_access` for defense-in-depth against tools like `docker`, `kubectl`, etc.
`override_deny`	Paths to exempt from deny groups (must also have a matching grant)

Adding a Deny Rule to an Inherited Profile

Block a specific path that a base profile would otherwise allow:

{
  "meta": {
    "name": "claude-deny-git",
    "version": "1.0.0"
  },
  "extends": "claude-code",
  "policy": {
    "add_deny_access": ["$HOME/.gitconfig"]
  }
}

nono run --profile claude-deny-git -- claude

Blocking Container Access (Docker, Podman, kubectl)

Use add_deny_access and add_deny_commands together for defense-in-depth:

{
  "extends": "claude-code",
  "meta": { "name": "no-docker", "version": "1.0.0" },
  "policy": {
    "add_deny_access": ["/var/run/docker.sock"],
    "add_deny_commands": ["docker", "docker-compose", "podman", "kubectl"]
  }
}

On macOS, add_deny_access on a socket path also emits a network-outbound deny — Seatbelt classifies connect(2) as a network operation, so a file deny alone won’t block it. add_deny_commands blocks the CLI tools directly as defense-in-depth.

Adding Write-Only Access

Grant write-only access to a directory without granting read:

{
  "meta": {
    "name": "write-only-cache",
    "version": "1.0.0"
  },
  "extends": "default",
  "policy": {
    "add_allow_write": ["$HOME/.cache/my-agent-cache"]
  },
  "workdir": {
    "access": "none"
  }
}

Removing Groups from an Inherited Profile

Remove the dangerous command blocking group to allow rm, chmod, etc.:

{
  "meta": {
    "name": "no-dangerous-commands",
    "version": "1.0.0"
  },
  "extends": "default",
  "policy": {
    "exclude_groups": [
      "dangerous_commands",
      "dangerous_commands_linux",
      "dangerous_commands_macos"
    ]
  }
}

Overriding a Deny Rule for a Specific Path

Some deny groups (like deny_credentials) are marked as required and cannot be excluded. Use override_deny to punch a targeted hole through a deny group for a specific path. The path must also be explicitly granted via filesystem or policy.add_allow_*.

{
  "meta": {
    "name": "docker-agent",
    "version": "1.0.0"
  },
  "extends": "opencode",
  "filesystem": {
    "allow": ["$HOME/.docker"]
  },
  "policy": {
    "override_deny": ["$HOME/.docker"]
  }
}

This allows access to ~/.docker even though deny_credentials blocks it by default. The deny override does not implicitly grant access — the matching filesystem.allow entry is required. This is equivalent to the CLI flag --override-deny:

nono run --profile opencode --allow ~/.docker --override-deny ~/.docker -- opencode

policy fields are additive across inheritance. A child profile’s add_deny_access is merged with the base profile’s add_deny_access, and exclude_groups from both levels are combined. The filesystem section works the same way - use policy when you need deny rules or write-only access that filesystem cannot express.

Network Configuration

The network section controls network access and credential injection.

{
  "network": {
    "block": false,
    "network_profile": "claude-code",
    "allow_domain": ["my-internal-api.example.com"],
    "open_port": [3000],
    "listen_port": [8080],
    "credentials": ["openai", "anthropic"],
    "upstream_proxy": "squid.corp:3128",
    "upstream_bypass": ["git.internal.corp", "*.dev.local"],
    "custom_credentials": {
      "telegram": {
        "upstream": "https://api.telegram.org",
        "credential_key": "telegram_bot_token",
        "inject_header": "Authorization",
        "credential_format": "Bearer {}"
      }
    }
  }
}

Field	Description
`block`	Block all network access (default: `false`)
`network_profile`	Network profile name for host filtering (e.g., `minimal`, `claude-code`, `enterprise`). Set to `null` in a child profile to clear an inherited value.
`allow_domain`	Additional domains to allow through the proxy
`open_port`	Localhost TCP ports to allow bidirectional IPC (equivalent to `--open-port`)
`listen_port`	TCP ports the sandboxed child may listen on (equivalent to `--listen-port`)
`credentials`	Credential services to enable via reverse proxy (e.g., `openai`, `anthropic`)
`custom_credentials`	Custom credential service definitions for APIs not in the built-in list
`upstream_proxy`	Upstream (enterprise) proxy address, e.g., `squid.corp:3128`
`upstream_bypass`	Domains to bypass the upstream proxy (exact hostnames and `*.` wildcards)

Custom Credentials

The custom_credentials field lets you define credential services for any API:

Field	Required	Default	Description
`upstream`	Yes	-	Upstream URL (must be HTTPS, or HTTP for localhost)
`credential_key`	Yes	-	Keystore account name
`inject_header`	No	`Authorization`	Header to inject credential into
`credential_format`	No	`Bearer {}`	Format string (`{}` replaced with credential)

See Credential Injection for complete documentation.

Hooks

The hooks section defines hooks that nono will automatically install for specific applications.

{
  "hooks": {
    "claude-code": {
      "event": "PostToolUseFailure",
      "matcher": "Read|Write|Edit|Bash",
      "script": "nono-hook.sh"
    }
  }
}

Hook installation is idempotent - nono only installs or updates when needed.

Interactive Mode (deprecated)

The interactive field is parsed for backward compatibility but ignored. Supervised mode (the default) preserves the TTY, making this field unnecessary.

{
  "meta": { "name": "my-agent" },
  "interactive": true
}

Rollback Exclusions

The rollback section controls which files are excluded from atomic rollback snapshots:

{
  "rollback": {
    "exclude_patterns": ["node_modules", ".next", "__pycache__", "target"],
    "exclude_globs": ["*.tmp.[0-9]*.[0-9]*"]
  }
}

These exclusions are combined with gitignore patterns from the working directory.

Skip Directories

Use skipdirs to extend the built-in heavy-directory skip list for pre-exec trust scanning and rollback preflight:

{
  "skipdirs": ["generated", "vendor-cache"]
}

Entries are matched as exact path component names. They do not grant or deny sandbox access; they only prune traversal during trust discovery and rollback heuristics.

Environment Variables

Profiles support these environment variables in path values:

Variable	Expands To
`$WORKDIR`	Current working directory (from `--workdir` or cwd)
`$HOME`	User’s home directory
`$XDG_CONFIG_HOME`	XDG config directory (default: `~/.config`)
`$XDG_DATA_HOME`	XDG data directory (default: `~/.local/share`)
`$XDG_STATE_HOME`	XDG state directory (default: `~/.local/state`)
`$XDG_CACHE_HOME`	XDG cache directory (default: `~/.cache`)
`$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR`	XDG runtime directory (no default; left unexpanded when unset)
`$TMPDIR`	System temporary directory
`$UID`	Current user ID

Creating User Profiles

Use nono profile init to scaffold a new profile:

# Scaffold a profile that inherits from default with the node_runtime group
nono profile init my-agent --extends default --groups node_runtime

# Validate the generated profile
nono policy validate ~/.config/nono/profiles/my-agent.json

# Use the profile
nono run --profile my-agent -- my-agent-command

See Profile Authoring for the full workflow, including JSON Schema integration, editor autocomplete, and the LLM authoring guide. You can also load a profile by file path:

nono run --profile ./profiles/my-agent.json -- my-command

Overriding Built-in Profiles

CLI flags always take precedence over profile settings:

# Use claude-code profile but block network
nono run --profile claude-code --block-net -- claude

# Use claude-code profile but add a custom domain
nono run --profile claude-code --allow-domain custom-api.example.com -- claude

# Add extra directory access
nono run --profile claude-code --allow ~/other-project -- claude

To keep a base profile but clear an inherited network profile, set network.network_profile to null in the child:

{
  "meta": { "name": "claude-code-netopen" },
  "extends": "claude-code",
  "network": { "network_profile": null }
}

You can also create a user profile with the same name to override a built-in profile entirely.

Groups

Groups are named, composable collections of security rules. Profiles reference groups by name in their security.groups field.

How Groups Compose

Every profile’s effective capability set is built through composition:

((default_profile_groups + profile.security.groups) - profile.policy.exclude_groups) + profile.policy.add_* + profile.filesystem - deny_groups + profile.policy.override_deny + CLI flags

default_profile_groups come from the built-in default profile
profile.security.groups add additional groups on top
profile.policy.exclude_groups removes groups from the composed set (exclusion wins)
profile.policy.add_allow_*, profile.policy.add_deny_access, and profile.policy.add_deny_commands apply additive overrides
profile.filesystem entries are additive
profile.policy.override_deny punches targeted holes through deny groups (requires matching grant)
CLI overrides (--allow, --read, --override-deny, etc.) are applied last

Exclusions are applied after group addition. If the same group appears in both security.groups and policy.exclude_groups, the exclusion wins.

Group Taxonomy

Groups use a structured allow/deny taxonomy:

Allow Operations

Field	Meaning
`allow.read`	Read-only access to listed paths
`allow.write`	Write-only access (no read)
`allow.readwrite`	Both read and write access

Deny Operations

Field	Meaning
`deny.access`	Block both read and write content (metadata like `stat` still allowed)
`deny.unlink`	Block file deletion globally
`deny.commands`	Block execution of listed commands

Other

Field	Meaning
`symlink_pairs`	macOS symlink-to-target path mappings (e.g., `/etc` to `/private/etc`)
`platform`	Restrict group to `"macos"` or `"linux"` only

Built-in Groups

nono ships with 32 built-in groups: Deny groups (block sensitive content):

deny_credentials - SSH keys, cloud credentials, GPG keys, container and package manager tokens
deny_keychains_macos - macOS Keychain databases, 1Password, password-store
deny_keychains_linux - Linux keyring, 1Password, password-store
deny_browser_data_macos - Browser data on macOS (Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge, Arc, Brave)
deny_browser_data_linux - Browser data on Linux (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Brave)
deny_macos_private - macOS Messages, Mail, Cookies, MobileSync
deny_shell_history - Shell history files (.bash_history, .zsh_history, .python_history)
deny_shell_configs - Shell config files that may contain API keys (.bashrc, .zshrc, .profile, .env)

Protection groups:

unlink_protection - Prevents file deletion, with override for user-writable paths
dangerous_commands - Blocks rm, dd, chmod, sudo, mkfs, pip, npm, kill, etc.
dangerous_commands_macos - macOS-specific: srm, brew, launchctl
dangerous_commands_linux - Linux-specific: shred, mkfs.*, fdisk, systemctl, apt, yum, dnf, pacman

System path groups (grant necessary system access):

system_read_macos - macOS system libraries, frameworks, dyld cache
system_read_linux - Linux system libraries, locale data
system_write_macos - macOS temp directories, cache paths
system_write_linux - Linux temp directories

Cache groups (user-level caches and state):

user_caches_macos - ~/Library/Caches, ~/Library/Logs, ~/Library/Preferences
user_caches_linux - ~/.cache, ~/.local/state

Runtime groups (language toolchain paths):

node_runtime - nvm, fnm, npm, pnpm, volta
rust_runtime - rustup, cargo
python_runtime - pyenv, conda, pip, uv
go_runtime - ~/go, /usr/local/go
nix_runtime - Nix profile paths, /nix/var (Linux only)
user_tools - Local bins, .desktop files, man pages, shell completions
homebrew - /opt/homebrew, /usr/local/Cellar, /usr/local/opt (macOS only)

Tool-specific groups (paths for specific applications):

claude_code_macos - macOS Keychain for Claude Code credential storage
claude_code_linux - ~/.local/share/claude
claude_cache_linux - ~/.cache/claude-cli-nodejs
codex_macos - macOS Keychain for Codex credential storage
opencode_linux - ~/.opencode/bin (Linux only, needed for Landlock exec)
vscode_macos - ~/.vscode, ~/Library/Application Support/Code
vscode_linux - ~/.vscode, ~/.config/Code

Command blocking is a best-effort surface-level control. It matches against the executable name being invoked directly. A process can bypass this by calling the equivalent syscall from within an allowed interpreter (e.g., os.remove() in Python, fs.unlinkSync() in Node.js) or by invoking a renamed copy of the binary. For hard filesystem protection, rely on the kernel-enforced deny groups and unlink_protection, which cannot be bypassed from userspace regardless of how the operation is invoked.

Platform-Specific Groups

Groups with a platform field only apply on that OS:

{
  "system_read_macos": {
    "platform": "macos",
    "allow": {
      "read": ["/System/Library", "/usr/lib"]
    }
  }
}

Groups without a platform field (like deny_credentials) apply on all platforms. Platform-specific groups use _macos or _linux suffixes by convention.

Platform Differences

macOS (Seatbelt) supports full deny-within-allow semantics. A group can allow /Users but deny /Users/luke/.ssh and the deny takes precedence. Linux (Landlock) is strictly allow-list. Deny groups are implemented as exclusion filters - broad allow groups that overlap deny paths will generate warnings. Avoid granting access to parent directories of deny paths on Linux.

Built-in Profiles

default

The base profile that all other profiles extend. Provides system path access, deny groups for sensitive content, and dangerous command blocking. Does not grant working directory access or any user-specific paths. Groups: deny_credentials, deny_keychains_macos, deny_keychains_linux, deny_browser_data_macos, deny_browser_data_linux, deny_macos_private, deny_shell_history, deny_shell_configs, system_read_macos, system_read_linux, system_write_macos, system_write_linux, user_tools, homebrew, dangerous_commands, dangerous_commands_macos, dangerous_commands_linux Network: Allowed CWD: None

claude-code

nono run --profile claude-code -- claude

Groups: claude_code_macos, claude_code_linux, user_caches_macos, claude_cache_linux, node_runtime, rust_runtime, python_runtime, vscode_macos, vscode_linux, nix_runtime, git_config, unlink_protection (plus default groups) Filesystem: ~/.claude (read+write), ~/.claude.json and ~/.claude.json.lock (read+write), plus platform-specific Claude Code and VS Code paths from the matching _macos or _linux groups, and git config files from git_config group Network: Allowed CWD: Read+write Special: Auto-installs Claude Code hooks. OAuth2 login support via open_urls (allows https://claude.ai and localhost). Profile opts into allow_launch_services for macOS browser opening.

codex

nono run --profile codex -- codex

Groups: codex_macos, node_runtime, rust_runtime, python_runtime, nix_runtime, git_config, unlink_protection (plus default groups) Filesystem: ~/.codex (read+write), plus git config files from git_config group Network: Allowed CWD: Read+write Special: OAuth2 login support via open_urls (allows https://auth.openai.com and localhost). Profile opts into allow_launch_services.

opencode

nono run --profile opencode -- opencode

Groups: user_caches_macos, user_caches_linux, node_runtime, opencode_linux, git_config, unlink_protection (plus default groups) Filesystem: ~/.config/opencode, ~/.cache/opencode, ~/.local/share/opencode, ~/.local/share/opentui (all read+write), plus git config files from git_config group Network: Allowed CWD: Read+write

openclaw

nono run --profile openclaw -- openclaw

Groups: node_runtime (plus default groups) Filesystem: ~/.openclaw, ~/.config/openclaw, ~/.local, $TMPDIR/openclaw-$UID (all read+write) Network: Allowed CWD: Read-only

swival

nono run --profile swival -- swival

Groups: python_runtime, node_runtime, user_caches_macos, user_caches_linux, git_config, unlink_protection (plus default groups) Filesystem: ~/.config/swival, ~/.local/share/swival (read+write), plus git config files from git_config group Network: Allowed CWD: Read+write

python-dev

nono run --profile python-dev -- my-python-app

Groups: python_runtime (plus default groups) Network: Allowed, with developer network profile for host filtering CWD: Read+write

node-dev

nono run --profile node-dev -- npm start

Groups: node_runtime (plus default groups) Network: Allowed, with developer network profile for host filtering CWD: Read+write

go-dev

nono run --profile go-dev -- go run .

Groups: go_runtime (plus default groups) Network: Allowed, with developer network profile for host filtering CWD: Read+write

rust-dev

nono run --profile rust-dev -- cargo run

Groups: rust_runtime (plus default groups) Network: Allowed, with developer network profile for host filtering CWD: Read+write

Requesting New Built-in Profiles

If you’d like a built-in profile for a tool not listed here:

Open an issue on the nono GitHub repository
Include:
- Tool name and repository URL
- Required filesystem access patterns
- Network requirements
- Any special considerations

Built-in profiles are reviewed for security before inclusion.

Getting Started

Features

Agents & Clients

Platform Internals

Reference

Development

​Profiles

​Why Profiles?

​Profile Sources

​Profile Format

​Working Directory

​Policy Overrides

​Adding a Deny Rule to an Inherited Profile

​Blocking Container Access (Docker, Podman, kubectl)

​Adding Write-Only Access

​Removing Groups from an Inherited Profile

​Overriding a Deny Rule for a Specific Path

​Network Configuration

​Custom Credentials

​Hooks

​Interactive Mode (deprecated)

​Rollback Exclusions

​Skip Directories

​Environment Variables

​Creating User Profiles

​Overriding Built-in Profiles

​Groups

​How Groups Compose

​Group Taxonomy

​Allow Operations

​Deny Operations

​Other

​Built-in Groups

​Platform-Specific Groups

​Platform Differences

​Built-in Profiles

​default

​claude-code

​codex

​opencode

​openclaw

​swival

​python-dev

​node-dev

​go-dev

​rust-dev

​Requesting New Built-in Profiles

Profiles

Why Profiles?

Profile Sources

Profile Format

Working Directory

Policy Overrides

Adding a Deny Rule to an Inherited Profile

Blocking Container Access (Docker, Podman, kubectl)

Adding Write-Only Access

Removing Groups from an Inherited Profile

Overriding a Deny Rule for a Specific Path

Network Configuration

Custom Credentials

Hooks

Interactive Mode (deprecated)

Rollback Exclusions

Skip Directories

Environment Variables

Creating User Profiles

Overriding Built-in Profiles

Groups

How Groups Compose

Group Taxonomy

Allow Operations

Deny Operations

Other

Built-in Groups

Platform-Specific Groups

Platform Differences

Built-in Profiles

default

claude-code

codex

opencode

openclaw

swival

python-dev

node-dev

go-dev

rust-dev

Requesting New Built-in Profiles